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Abstract 
We present a general approach for introducing specificity information into nonmonotonic the- 
ories. Historically, many approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning, including default logic, circum- 
scription, and autoepistemic logic, do not provide an account of specificity, and so fail to enforce 
specificity among default sentences. In our approach, a default theory is initially given as a set 
of strict and defeasible rules. By making use of a theory of default conditionals, here given 
by System Z, we isolate minimal sets of defaults with specificity conflicts. From the specificity 
information intrinsic in these sets, a default theory in a target language is specified. For default 
logic the end result is a semi-normal default theory; in circumscription the end result is a set of 
abnormality propositions that, when circumscribed, yield a theory in which specificity information 
is appropriately handled. We mainly deal with default logic and circumscription although we also 
consider autoepistemic logic, Theorist, and variants of default logic and circumscription, This 
approach differs from previous work in that specificity information is obtained from information 
intrinsic in a set of conditionals, rather than assumed to exist a priori. Moreover, we deal with 
the “standard” version of, for example, default logic and circumscription, and do not rely on 
prioritised versions, as do other approaches. The approach is both uniform and general, so the 
choice of the ultimate target language has little effect on the overall approach. @ 1997 Elsevier 
Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
A general problem in many approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning is that they do not 
enforce specificity relations among default assertions as part of their basic machinery. 
Consider for example where birds fly, birds have wings, penguins must be birds, and 
penguins don’t fly. We can write this as: 
(1) 
From this theory, given that P is true, one would want to conclude TF by default. 
Intuitively, being a penguin is a more specific notion than that of being a bird, and, in 
the case of a conflict, we would want to use the more specific default. Also, given that 
P is true one would want to conclude that W was true, and so penguins have wings by 
virtue of being birds. 
Default logic [42], circumscription [ 341, and autoepistemic logic 1361 are examples 
of approaches that do not take specificity information into account. For example, in the 
ndive representation of the above theory in default logic, we obtain one extension (i.e., 
a set of default conclusions) in which TF is true and another in which F is true. One 
is required to use so-called semi-normal defaults’ to eliminate the second extension. 
However, it is up to the user to hand-code how specificity is dealt with. Reiter and 
Criscuolo [ 431, for example, give a partial list of ways of transforming default theories 
so that unwanted extensions arising from specific “interactions” are eliminated. 
There are more recent approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning, based generally on 
intuitions from probability theory or conditional logics, that deal with specificity in a 
very natural way. Moreover, in the past few years there has been some consensus as 
to what should constitute a basic conditional system. This, arguably, is illustrated by 
the convergence (or at least similarity among) systems such as those developed in 
[ 5,11,20,28,39], yet which are derived according to seemingly disparate intuitions. 
A general problem with these accounts however is that they are too weak. Thus in 
a conditional logic, even though a bird may be assumed to fly by default, a green 
bird cannot be assumed to fly by default (since it is conceivable that greenness is 
relevant to flight). In these systems some mechanism is required to assert that properties 
not known to be relevant are irrelevant. This is done in conditional logics by meta- 
theoretic assumptions, and in probabilistic accounts by independence assumptions. In 
other approaches there are problems concerning property inheritance, and so one may 
not obtain the inference that a penguin has wings. While various solutions have been 
proposed, none are entirely satisfactory. 
Our approach is to use the specificity information determined by a conditional system 
to generate a default theory in a nonmonotonic reasoning system, such as default logic, 
so that specificity is appropriately handled in the latter approach. Hence we address two 
related but essentially independent questions: 
( 1) How can a conditional system be used to isolate interacting defaults with differing 
specificity? 
2 See Section 4. I for a definition of semi-normal defaults and the way they deal with unwanted extensions. 
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(2) How can this information be uniformly incorporated in a theory expressed in a 
nonmonotonic reasoning system where specificity is not directly addressed? 
For the first part, we consider System Z [39] as an example of a conditional system 
of defeasible reasoning. For the second part, we consider first consistency-based ap- 
proaches, as exemplified by default logic [42] ; subsequently we consider variants of 
default logic and other related approaches. Second we consider minimisation-based ap- 
proaches, as exemplified by circumscription [ 341, and again variants and related systems. 
We begin with a background theory made up of a set of strict rules RN = {r 1 a, + 
p,.} assumed to be true in every setting, together with a set of defeasible rules Ro = 
{r 1 ay, + &}, where each CY, and pr are arbitrary propositional formulas. By means of 
System Z we isolate minimally conflicting sets of defaults with differing specificities; the 
defaults in such a set should never be simultaneously applicable. Notably we do not use 
the full ordering given by System Z (which has difficulties of its own, as described in 
Section 3.1), but rather appeal to the techniques of this approach to isolate conflicting 
subsets of defaults. In a second step, we use the derived specificity information to 
produce, for instance, a set of default rules in default logic, or a classical theory that 
can be circumscribed, in such a way that specificity is suitably handled. The framework 
described then is a general approach to “compiling” default theories, using a conditional 
approach to determine specificity conflicts, into an approach to nonmonotonic reasoning 
where specificity is not “automatically” handled. 
This framework offers several advantages over earlier work. First, it is more general, 
in that it is applicable to broad classes of systems, rather than to a specific system. In 
addition, within a specific system, the class of specificity conflicts handled is broader 
than previous work, addressing for example the situation of a set of less specific defaults 
with a more specific default. Second, specificity information is obtained by appealing 
to an extant theory of defaults, and not simply to some external user-specified ordering 
of defaults. So the present approach provides a justification for these modifications. 
Third, specificity is added to default logic (or autoepistemic logic, circumscription, 
etc.) without changing the machinery of default logic. That is, the resultant default 
theory is a theory in default logic, and not for example a set of ordered default rules 
requiring modifications to default logic. Hence we effectively remain within the original 
formalism, and so can take advantage of previous work (including implementations) 
concerning these approaches. In addition, we prove that specificity conflicts are indeed 
resolved in a general fashion, leaving unchanged other conflicts (as are found for 
example in a “Nixon diamond”). 
In the next subsection we briefly cover background material, while Section 2 intro- 
duces our approach. Section 3 shows how specificity conflicts are determined. Section 4 
shows how specificity is compiled into consistency-based approaches to nonmonotonic 
reasoning, while Section 5 does the same for minimisation-based approaches. Section 6 
gives a brief summary. Portions of this work appeared earlier in [ 13,141. 
1.1. Default theories 
Knowledge about the world, given in a knowledge base A, is assumed to be divided 
into two sets: 
304 
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Background knowledge, or facts or rules which are assumed to be applicable 
in every domain. 
Contingent knowledge, or facts which are true in the case under consideration 
and which may vary from case to case. 
This is essentially the difference between necessary and contingent knowledge in 
modal logics [ 261, or between probabilistic knowledge and conditioning knowledge in 
probabilistic reasoning systems [38]. Background knowledge in turn consists of two 
sets: 
Ro: Default implications, or rules that are usually true but allow exceptions. 
RN: Necessary implications, or rules which must be true in any setting. 
This division is found in the various conditional approaches to default reasoning in 
artificial intelligence, such as [ 5,11,20,22] and less directly in [ 281. 3 The background 
knowledge provides a generic world description. Elements of W are formulas of classical 
logic. Elements of RD are formulas of the form (Y -+ p while elements of RN are 
formulas of the form (Y + p, where CY and p are propositional formulas. The expression 
of elements of RN as rules is a convenience only since an arbitrary strict formula LY can 
be expressed by T + a. Note too that we reserve > for classical (material) implication. 
So a knowledge base is of the form A = ( (RD, RN), W), where (RD, RN) represents 
generic world knowledge and W represents case specific knowledge. Our initial example 
is represented as: 
R=({B+F,B+WP--t+},{P+B}). (2) 
It should be obvious how these sets would be mapped into a particular approach 
to nonmonotonic reasoning. In default logic, for example, elements of Ro would be 
mapped into default rules, and everything else would be considered as world knowl- 
edge; in circumscription, elements of R o would be mapped to implications with ab 
propositions, while again everything else would be considered as world knowledge. 
However, as the previous section pointed out, the “obvious” mappings are problematic 
in that specificity is not properly handled. The purpose of this paper then might be seen 
as developing a general, provably correct “compilation” scheme to address specificity 
for those approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning that, as part of their formalism, do not. 
1.2. Related work 
Arguably, specificity per se was first specifically addressed in default reasoning in 
[ 401, although it has of course appeared earlier. As mentioned, we could have used 
a conditional system other than System Z in our approach; however, System Z is 
particularly straightforwardly describable. Some approaches though are too weak to be 
useful here. For example conditional entailment [20] does not support full inheritance 
reasoning, in that from {A --+ B, B -+ C, C --f D, A -+ ‘D} we cannot conclude C by 
3 The roots of such approaches however extend at least as far back as [ I.3 1,451. 
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default from A. The work [ 121 is unsatisfactory since it gives a syntactic, albeit general, 
approach in a conditional logic. 
Conditional approaches are founded, one way or another, on notions of preference or 
normality. Conditional logics for default conditionals [ 5,111, for example, are modal 
logics [9,26] where we can view possible worlds as being ordered by a metric of 
normality or unexceptionalness. A default conditional IX -+ p is true, roughly, if in the 
least worlds where Q is true, p is true also. For our example (l), at the least worlds 
where B is true, F is true also; at the least worlds where P is true, -F is true. Since we 
also have that P a B (we could as easily have P + B), it can be seen that the least P 
worlds must be more exceptional than (or less normal than) the least B worlds. If we 
now say that p follows as a default inference from (Y in default theory R just when p 
is true in the least cx worlds, we obtain a form of default inference in which specificity 
is obtained and, for example, penguins normally don’t fly whereas birds do. 
These approaches are quite weak: since it is conceivable that green birds do not fly 
(i.e., there are models where in the least green bird worlds these birds do not fly), it 
does not follow by default that a green bird flys, even though a bird does. While various 
approaches have been proposed to strengthen such basic systems, including rational 
closure [ 281, System Z, CO* [ 51, possibilistic entailment [ 41, and conditional objects 
[ 161, none is entirely satisfactory. In this regard, System Z is examined as an exemplar 
of these approaches in Section 3.1. 
In default logic, Reiter and Criscuolo [43] consider various patterns of specificity 
in interacting defaults, and describes how specificity may be obtained via semi-normal 
defaults. However these patterns are just commonly occurring configurations of de- 
faults, and there is no notion of this being a complete characterisation. This work may 
be regarded as a pre-theoretic forerunner to the present approach, since the situations 
addressed therein all constitute instances of what we call (in Section 3) minimal con- 
flicting sets. Etherington and Reiter [ 181 also consider a problem that fits within the 
(overall) present framework: specificity information is given by an inheritance network, 
and this network is compiled into a default theory in default logic (see Section 4.3). 
More recent work develops priority orderings on default theories, including [ 2,6,8]. 
However these approaches obtain specificity by requiring modifications to how default 
logic is used. In contrast, we describe transformations that yield classical default logic 
theories. Since these approaches are described in Section 4, they are introduced only 
briefly here. Boutilier [6] uses the correspondence between a conditional a, + pr of 
System Z and defaults of the form s to produce partitioned sets of prerequisite-free 
normal default rules. One reasons in this approach by applying the rules in the highest 
set, and working down. Baader and Hollunder [2] address specificity in terminological 
reasoners. This approach does not rely on conflicts between “levels”; rather a subsump- 
tion relation between terminological concepts is mapped onto a set of partially ordered 
defaults in default logic. Brewka [8] has adopted the idea of minimal conflicting sets 
described here, but in a more restricted setting. In common with [ 21, partially ordered 
defaults in default logic are used; however, for inferencing all consistent strict total 
orders of defaults must be considered. 
Similar remarks apply to circumscription, and to other related approaches. Circum- 
scription was introduced in [34], and the use of ab predicates in prioritised, param- 
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eterised circumscription to address specificity was addressed in [ 32,351. Grosof [24] 
extended prioritised circumscription to deal with partial orders. These approaches are 
discussed more fully in Section 5.3. 
Lastly there are direct or path-based approaches to nonmonotonic inheritance, as 
expressed using inheritance networks [ 251. It is difficult to compare such approaches 
with our own for two reasons. First, inheritance networks are concerned, broadly, with 
general notions having to do with arguments or nonmonotonic inheritance. Our interests 
are narrower, being limited to specificity. Second, the account of meaning for such 
networks is most often given in terms of paths in the network, and so tend not to rely 
on more standard model-theoretic notions. Nonetheless, in Section 4.3 we compare our 
approach with probably the best known translation of an inheritance network, where the 
network is translated into a theory in default logic, that of [ 181. 
2. Overview of the approach 
There are two major steps in the approach. First, given a default theory expressed 
as a generic world description, we locate default rules that conflict and have differing 
specificity; this is accomplished by using (part of) the mechanism of System Z. So for 
our initial example (1) it is clear that the defaults B + F and P -+ TF conflict and 
that the second default is more specific than the first. Secondly, we compile the default 
theory into a nonmonotonic reasoning system such as default logic or circumscription, 
so that if both defaults are potentially applicable-say, B and P are true-then only the 
second default is applied. In outline, this is carried out as follows. 
In System Z, defaults are partitioned into sets Ra, RI,. . ., where, roughly, the defaults 
in a lower ranked partition are less specific than those in a higher ranked partition. 
The resulting partition is called a Z-ordering. For our initial example, treating the strict 
implication as a default for the moment, we would obtain the partition: 
The key point in determining the partition is that, if we treat + as classical implication, 
then for a! --+ p E Ri we have that 
{CY A p} U Ri U Ri+l U.. . 
is satisfiable, whereas 
{a A p} U Ri_1 U Ri U Ri+l U . . ’ 
is unsatisfiable. So the Z-ordering provides specificity information; however, we do not 
use the full Z-ordering since it may introduce unwanted specificities (Section 3.1). 
Rather we determine minimal sets of rules that conflict, and use these sets to sort out 
specificity information. In the above example, {B -+ E P + B, P --+ ‘F} would be 
such a set, since if we delete any of the three defaults we would have a set with no 
conflict or with no difference in specificity. 
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There are numerous issues that need to be confronted, even with relatively simple 
theories. Consider the following extended example, already expressed as a Z-ordering; 
we will make reference to this example throughout the paper. For simplicity we have 
expressed all rules as default rules. 
RO = {An -+ WB,An + TFe,An --+ M}, 
R1={B+An,B--+F,B+Fe,B--tW}, 
R:!={P+B,P--t ~F,E+B,E+~EPt-+B,Pt--+~Fe,Pt-+~WB). 
That is, in Ro, animals are warm-blooded, don’t have feathers, but are mobile. In RI, 
birds are animals that fly, have feathers, and have wings. In R2, penguins and emus 
are birds that don’t fly, and pterodactyls are birds that have no feathers and are not 
warm-blooded. 
First we locate the minimal (with respect to set inclusion) sets of rules that differ 
in specificity and that conflict; this will be the minimal set of rules having a nontrivial 
Z-ordering. In our example these consist of: 
Co = {An -+ -Fe, B + An, B -+ Fe}, 
C’={B+F,P+B,P-F}, 
C2={B+F,E+B,E-F}, 
C3 = {B ---f Fe,Pt ---t B,Pt + TFe}, 
(3) 
(4) 
C4 = {An + WB, B -+ An,Pt -+ B,Pt 4 1WB). 
Any such set is called a minimal conjlicting set of rules. For any such set, if all the 
rules are jointly applicable then one way or another there will be a conflict. 4 Note that 
both of these notions are crucial. If we have a conflict without a specificity difference, 
for example with the defaults, 
then given Q A R there is no reason to apply one rule over another. If we have a 
specificity difference without a conflict, say birds fly and tropical birds are colourful: 
B+E BAT--+C 
then given B A T there is again no reason to not apply both defaults. 
We show below that the Z-ordering of each such set C consists of a binary partition 
(CO, Cl ) of rules. Furthermore the rules in the set CO are less specific than those in Cl. 
Consequently, if the rules in Cl are applicable, then we would want to insure that some 
rule in CO was blocked. For example, for the minimal conflicting set C’ we obtain: 
C; = {B + F}, (5) 
c;={P+B,P--,~F}. (6) 
4 If the rules were represented as normal default rules in default logic for example, one would obtain multiple 
extensions. 
308 J.f! Delgrande, ZH. Schaub/Artifcial Intelligence 90 (1997) 301-348 
There are now two important issues that need to be addressed: 
( 1) What rules should be selected as candidates to be blocked, using minimal con- 
flicting sets? 
(2) How can the application of a rule be blocked in the target nonmonotonic formal- 
ism? 
For the first question, consider where we have a chain of rules, and where transitivity 
is explicitly blocked, as in the minimal conflicting set C4 above. We have the Z-ordering: 
C,f={An+WB,B+An}, 
Cf = {Pt -+ B, Pt + TWB}. 
(7) 
Intuitively An is less specific than Pt. If we were given that An, Pt, 1B were true, 
then in a translation into default logic, we would want the default rule corresponding to 
Pt + TWB to be applicable over An + WB, even though the “linking” rule Pt + B is 
falsified. So we want more specific rules to be applicable over less specific conflicting 
rules, independently of the other rules in the minimal conflicting set. We do this by 
locating those rules whose joint applicability would lead to an inconsistency. In our 
example, this consists of An -+ WB, and Pt + TWB (since (An A WB) A (Pt A TWB) 
is inconsistent). Since An -+ WB E Ci and Pt + TWB E Cf, the rules have differing 
specificity. The rules selected in this way from Ci and Cp are called the minimal 
co@cting rules and maximal conjicting rules respectively. The minimal conflicting 
rules constitute the candidates to be blocked. This selection criterion has the important 
property that it is context independent, in the following fashion. For default theories R 
and R’, where R C R’, if r E R is selected, then I should also be selected in R’. Thus, 
if we wish to block the default B --+ F in the case of P in default theory R, then we 
will also want to block this rule in any superset R’. 
The second question, (“How can the application of a rule be blocked?‘) depends 
on the target nonmonotonic formalism. However we argue that our approach is broadly 
applicable to nonmonotonic formalisms that do not, in and of themselves, address speci- 
ficity issues. In Section 4 we deal with the major consistency-based formalisms; Section 5 
addresses minimisation-based formalisms. For default logic5 for example, we have the 
following translation of rules. The default theory corresponding to our default rules Ro 
consists of normal defaults, except for those defaults representing minimal conflicting 
rules, which are semi-normal. For these latter default rules, the prerequisite is the an- 
tecedent of the original rule (as expected). The justification consists of the consequent 
together with an assertion to the effect that the maximal conflicting rules in the minimal 
conflicting set cannot be applicable. 
Consider the set Co4 in (7), along with its minimal conflicting rule An + WB. We 
replace B + An, Pt -+ B, Pt -+ TWB with 
B : An Pt : B Pt : 7WB 
An ’ B ’ 7WB 
respectively. For An + WB, we replace it with 
5 A formal introduction to default logic is given in Section 4.1. 
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An : WB A (Pt > 1WB) 
WB 
which can be simplified to 
An: WBAlPt 
WB ’ 
So, for the minimal conflicting rules we obtain semi-normal defaults; all other defaults 
are normal. Accordingly, we give below only the semi-normal default rules constructed 
from the minimal conflicting sets Co to C4: 
CO: 
An : -Fe A (B > Fe) An:TFeATB 
TFe 
or 
-Fe ’ 
c,+c2: B:FA(P>lF)A(E>7F) B:FA-PATE 
F 
or 
F ’ 
c’: 
B : Fe A (Pt > TFe) 
Fe 
B : Fe A TPt 
or 
Fe ’ 
C4: 
An : WBA (Pt > -WB) An: WBATPt 
or 
WB WB ’ 
The conditional B --+ F occurs in C’ and C* as a minimal conflicting rule. In this case 
we have two minimal conflicting sets sharing the same minimal conflicting rule, and we 
combine the maximal conflicting rules of both sets. 
So why does this approach work? The formal details are given in the following 
sections. However, informally, consider where we have a minimal conflicting set of 
defaults C with a single minimal conflicting rule (~0 -+ PO and a single maximal 
conflicting rule LYE -+ pt. If we can prove that cya (and so in default logic can prove the 
antecedent of the conditional), then pa may be a default conclusion, provided that no 
more specific rule applies. But what should constitute the justification? Clearly, that /?a is 
consistent and that more specific, conflicting conditionals not be applicable. Now, in our 
setting, LYO -+ PO is such that ((~0 A PO} is satisfiable, but for the conditional crt -+ pt, 
{~oAPo}‘J{~l Apt} is unsatisfiable. Hence it must be that {cu~A&}U{a~ > PI} b -WI 
for these conditionals. Thus if a minimal conflicting rule is applicable, then the maximal 
rule cannot be applicable. Hence we add these more specific conditionals as part of the 
justification. 
We show too that this approach is applicable to general default theories and not, as the 
preceding examples might indicate, just simple chains of defaults. Consider the following 
example, in which we have two less specific default rules, a situation frequently found 
in multiple inheritance networks. We have the Z-ordering: 
Ro={A--t~B,C+~D}, (8) 
RI=(A~C+BvD}. (9) 
In this case we would want to ensure that if the default in RI were applicable, then at 
most one default in Ro can be applied. One can also show that conflicts that do not 
result from specificity (as found for example, in the “Nixon diamond”) are handled 
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correctly. These and other examples are discussed in detail following the presentation 
of the formal details. 
3. Determining specificity conflicts 
3.1. System Z 
In System Z a set of rules R representing default conditionals is partitioned into 
an ordered list of mutually exclusive sets of rules Ro, . . . , R,. Lower ranked rules are 
considered more normal (or less specific) than higher ranked rules. Rules in lower 
ranked sets are compatible with those in higher ranked sets, whereas rules in higher 
ranked sets conJlict in some fashion with ru!es in lower ranked sets. Pearl [39] deals 
only with default rules, whereas the extension described in [22] deals with default and 
strict rules. For our use of System Z we do not need to distinguish default and strict 
rules, 6 and so we describe the original approach. We assume that we begin with a set 
of defeasible conditionals R = {r 1 a, -+ &} where each (Y, and fir are propositional 
formulas over a finite alphabet. A central notion is that of toleration: 
Definition 1. Let R be a set of defeasible conditionals. 
A rule (Y + j? is tolerated by R iff {a A /3} U {a, > & 1 r E R} is satisfiable. 
Note that this definition treats the connective -+ as >. 
We assume in what follows that R is Z-consistent,7 i.e., for every nonempty R’ 2 R, 
some r’ E R’ is tolerated by R’. Using this notion of tolerance, a Z-ordering on the rules 
in R is defined: 
( 1) Find all rules tolerated by R, and call this subset Ro. 
(2) Next, find all rules tolerated by (R - Ro), and call this subset RI. 
(3) Continue in this fashion until all rules in R have been accounted for. 
In this way, we obtain a partition ( Ro, . . . , R,) of R where 
Ri={rIristoleratedby (R-Ro-...-Ri_l)} 
for 1 < i 6 n. More generally, we write Ri to denote the ith set of rules in the partition 
of a set of conditionals R. A set of rules R, or its Z-ordering, respectively, is called 
trivial iff its partition consists only of a single set of rules. 
The rank of rule r, written Z(r), is given by: Z(r) = i iff r E Ri. Every interpretation 
M of R is given a Z-rank, Z(M), according to the highest ranked rule in R it falsifies: 
Z(M) = min{n 1 M + cr, 3 &,Z(r) 2 n}. 
When interpreting all rules in our example ( 1) as defeasible, we obtain the following 
Z-ordering: 
6 Essentially we use System Z to isolate conflicting rules, independent of whether they are strict or default. 
This distinction is important for us only when deciding on what rules to block. 
’ Pearl [39] uses the term consistent. 
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RO=(B+F,B+W}, 
R,=(P+TF,P-,B}. (IO) 
So the Z-rank of the model in which B, lF, W, and P are true is 1, since the rule 
B --+ F is falsified. The Z-rank of the model in which B, F, W, and P are true is 2, 
since the rule P --+ -F is falsified. The rank of an arbitrary formula cp is defined as the 
lowest Z-rank of all models satisfying cp: Z(p) = min{Z( M) 1 M k cp}. * Finally we 
can define a form of default entailment, called l-entailment, as follows: A formula cp 
is said to l-entail 4 in the context R, written (D kt 4, iff Z(p A 4) < Z(p A -4). In 
the terminology of Section 1 .l, the background theory R determines a Z-ordering, and 
CY follows from our contingent knowledge W iff W t-1 (Y. 
This gives a form of default inference that has some very nice properties. In the 
preceding example, we obtain that P k1 TF, and P l-1 B and so penguins don’t fly, but 
are birds. Unlike default logic, we cannot infer that penguins fly, i.e., P y1 F. Some 
irrelevant facts are handled well (unlike conditional logics), and for example we have 
B A G t-1 F, so green birds fly. There are two weaknesses with this approach. First, 
one cannot inherit properties across exceptional subclasses. So one cannot conclude 
that penguins have wings (even though penguins are birds and birds have wings), i.e., 
P y, W. Second, undesirable specificities are sometimes obtained. For example, if we 
add to the above example the default that large animals are calm we get the Z-ordering: 
Ro={B+EB~~L~C}, (11) 
R1=(P++P--,B}. (12) 
Intuitively L + C is irrelevant to the other defaults, yet one obtains the default conclu- 
sion that large animals aren’t normally penguins since Z(L A TP) < Z(L A P). 
Goldszmidt and Pearl [23] have shown that l-entailment is equivalent to rational 
closure [ 281; Boutilier [5] has shown that CO* is equivalent to l-entailment. Pearl 
[39] notes that preferential entailment [30] is equivalent to the more basic notion 
of O-entailment (also e-entailment [ 371 or p-entailment [ 11 ), proposed in [ 381 as a 
“conservative core” for default reasoning. Consequently, given this “locus” of closely 
related systems, each based on distinct semantic intuitions, these systems (of which 
we have chosen System Z as exemplar) would seem to agree on a principled minimal 
approach to defaults. 
3.1.1. Why System Z? 
The previous subsection described System Z, which we use to isolate minimal sets of 
rules (strict and default) that conflict with respect to specificity. The natural questions 
arise, why choose System Z when, as indicated previously, it is not unproblematic? And, 
are there alternatives to the choice of System Z? 
First of all, we do not use System Z per se, but rather the notion of tolerance; this 
we use to isolate minimal sets of rules with a nontrivial partition. In such (minimal) 
sets the problems of unwanted specificities do not arise (since there are no “irrelevant” 
8 If there is no model satisfying 4 we set the rank of 4 BS 03. 
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rules). Moreover, we are unconcerned about lack of property inheritance since we obtain 
such inheritance in the target language, whether it be default logic, circumscription, or 
some other. 
In the second case, while there are approaches that could be used in place of System 
Z, System Z (or the part that we use) is certainly the simplest. For those familiar with 
conditional logics (or related approaches) we note that a system corresponding to the 
conservative core is too weak for our purposes. In particular, such a system allows the 
conditionals 
to be simultaneously and nontrivially satisfied. For a logic of defaults, this appears 
unreasonable: if y follows by default from cy, then it would seem that it should also 
follow from either cy A /? or (Y A l/3. Arguably the weakest logic in which cy -+ y > 
((aAP-)y)V(c~A~~-,y))isatheorem,isN[ll].Ifwedonotconsidernegated 
conditionals, then this is equivalent to VTA [ 311 or CO [5], and is the conditional 
equivalent of S4.3 [ 261. While these latter systems could be used as a basis from which 
specificity information could be determined, System Z is markedly easier to describe 
than these other approaches; moreover determining l-entailment is efficient (disregarding 
consistency tests). 
3.2. Minimal conflicting sets 
We consider Z-consistent generic world descriptions R = (RD, RN) where the an- 
tecedents and consequents of rules in R are propositional formulas over a finite alphabet. 
For simplicity, we sometimes identify R with RD URN. For Z-orderings of subsets of R, 
we treat the connective + as + (that is, we do not distinguish strict and default rules 
in an ordering). We denote the set of classical implications corresponding to a set R of 
strict and/or defeasible rules by R*. That is, 
R* = {a > /? 1 a + p E RI,} U {a > p 1 a =+ p E RN}. 
Moreover, we define 
Prereq( R) = {LY 1 a --+ p E RD} U {a 1 a + p E RN}, 
Conseq( R) = {/3 ) a -+ P E RD} U {P 1 UT =+ P E RN}. 
The set of minimal conflicting sets of a set of rules R represents conflicts among the 
rules in R due to disparate specificity. Each minimal conflicting set is a minimal set of 
conditionals having a nontrivial Z-ordering. 
Definition 2. Let R = (RD, RN) be a generic world description. A set of rules C c R 
is a minimal conflicting set in R iff C has a nontrivial Z-ordering and any C’ c C has 
a trivial Z-ordering. 
That is, the rules in C make up a nontrivial Z-ordering and they form a least set 
for which a nontrivial ordering is obtained. A minimal conflicting set then constitutes a 
J.P. Delgrande, ZH. Schub/Artificial Intelligence 90 (1997) 301-348 313 
minimal theory in which there is a specificity conflict. Observe that adding new rules 
to R cannot alter or destroy any existing minimal conflicting sets. That is, for default 
theories R and R’, where C C R G R’, we have that if C is a minimal conflicting set in 
R then C is a minimal conflicting set in R’. This property is of great practical relevance 
since it allows an incremental computation of minimal conflicting sets, even in evolving 
knowledge bases. 
The next theorem shows that any minimal conflicting set has a binary partition: 
Theorem 3. Let C be a minimal conjlicting set in some generic world description 
(Ro, RN). Then, we have that the Z-ordering of C is (CO, Cl ) for some nonempty sets 
CoandC1 withC=CoUCI. 
Moreover, a minimal conflicting set entails the negations of the antecedents of the 
higher-level rules: 
Theorem 4. Let C be a minimal conj%cting set in R. If (Y -+ p E Cl then C’ b ~a. 
Hence, given our initial generic world description in (2), 
there is one minimal conflicting set 
C={B+F;P++P+B}. 
As shown in (5), (6), the first rule constitutes CO and the last two Ct in the Z- 
ordering of C (in fact, the last rule provides rather necessary linking knowledge, as 
explicated in (13). If we discard the necessary knowledge provided by P + B, the 
set {B --+ F;P + ‘F} is not a minimal conflicting set since alone it has a trivial 
Z-ordering. Replacing P + B by P -+ B yields obviously the same minimal conflicting 
set. It is easy to see that C* b -P. 
Intuitively, a minimal conflicting set consists of three mutually exclusive sets of rules: 
the least specific or minimal conjlicting rules in C, min( C) ; the most specific or maximal 
conf7icting rules in C, max( C) ; and the remaining rules providing a minimal inferential 
relation between these two sets of rules, inf(C). The following definition provides a 
general formal frame for these sets: 
Definition 5. Let R be a generic world description and let C be a minimal conflicting 
set in R. We define max( C), min( C), and inf( C) to be nonempty subsets of C such 
that 
min(C) C CO, 
max(C) G Cl, 
inf(C) = C - (min(C) Umax(C)). 
We observe that min, max, and inf are exclusive subsets of C such that C = min( C) U 
inf(C) U mu(C). We show below that the rules in mu.r(C) and min(C) are indeed 
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conflicting due to their different specificity. Note however that the following three 
theorems are independent of the choice of min( C), inf( C), and max( C). However 
following these theorems we argue in Definition 10 for a specific choice for these sets 
that complies with the intuitions described in the previous section. 
First, the antecedents of the most specific rules in min(C) imply the antecedents of 
the least specific rules in mux( C) modulo the “inferential rules” in inf( C) : 
Theorem 6. Let C be a minimal conflicting set in a generic world description (Rp, RN). 
Then. we have: 
inf(C)* Umax(C)* + Prereq(max(C)) 3 Prereq(min(C)). 
In fact, inf( C) * U max( C) * constitutes the weakest condition under which the above 
entailment holds. Note that omitting max(C) would eliminate rules that may belong to 
max( C) , yet provide “inferential relations”. This is the case for the rule P + B in (5), 
(6) : P =S B is in Cl and so is a potential candidate for max( C), even though this 
choice is not a reasonable one (since of course, P + B should be a part of inf( C) ). 
The same applies of course to a defeasible rule like P + B. 
The next theorem shows that the converse of the previous does not hold in general. 
Theorem 7. Let C be a minimal conflicting set in a generic world description (Rp, RN). 
Then, for any set of rules R’ such that C s R’ and any set of rules R” s min(C) such 
that R’ U Prereq (R”) is satisfiable, we have: 
( R’) * v Prereq (R”) > Prereq (max( C) ) . 
The reason for considering consistent subsets of min(C) is that its entire set of pre- 
requisites might be equivalent to those in max( C) . Then, however, C U Pmreq (min( C) ) 
and so R’ U Prereq( min( C) ) is inconsistent. This is, for instance, the case in (8)) (9). 
In fact, (R’) * is the strongest condition under which the above theorem holds. 
Finally, we demonstrate that these rules are indeed conflicting. 
Theorem 8. Let C be a minimal conjicting set in a generic world description (Rp , RN). 
Then, for any a --+ /3 E max( C) , we have: 
inf(C)* U {a} + -(C onseq(min(C)) A Conseq(max(C))). 
As above, inf( C ) * U { a is the weakest condition under which the last entailment } 
holds. In all, the last three theorems demonstrate that the general framework given 
for minimal conflicting sets (already) provides a very expressive way of isolating rule 
conflicts due to their specificity. 
In the worst case the number of minimal conflicting sets grows exponentially with 
the size of a default theory. This is an artifact of the problem in general, rather than 
the specific approach at hand-there may simply be an exponential number of ways in 
which a set of defaults conflict. 
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Theorem 9. There exist generic world descriptions R of size n such that the number 
of minimal conjlicting sets is of size O(2”). 
Consider for example the class of default theories where we have 
a --f Pi,1 for i E {1,2}, 
Pi,j + Pi’,.j+l for i, i’ E { 1,2} and 1 < j < n, 
Pi,n + Y for i E {1,2}. 
For a given n there are clearly 2 ’ “inferential paths” between (Y and y. If we add the 
default LY -+ ly, then clearly for given n there are 2n minimal conflicting sets. While 
this characterises the worst case, in general we might expect the number of minimal 
conflicting sets to be more manageable. For example, in an inheritance hierarchy where 
a different “exception” type accounts for each level in the hierarchy, we would have a 
set of minimal conflicting sets that is linear in the size of the hierarchy. 
3.3. Specific minimal and maximal conflicting rules 
A minimal conflicting set C = (CO, Cl ), is a minimal set of rules that contains 
a specificity conflict. However we need to isolate a minimal subset CA s CO whose 
application would conflict with a minimal subset of rules in C{ C Cl. We do this in the 
following definition of a conjlicting core of a minimal conflicting set: 
Definition 10. Let C = (CO, Cl ) be a minimal conflicting set. A conflicting core of C 
is a pair of least sets (min( C), max( C) ) where 
(1) min(C) C CO n Ro, 
(2) ma(C) C Cl f-~ RD, 
(3) {a, A Pr I r E max(C> Urnin( k 1, 
provided that min( C) and max( C) are nonempty. 
This definition specialises the general setting of Definition 5. So, cr, -+ pr is in 
min( C) if its application conflicts with that of a rule (or rules) in Cl. By isolating the 
actually conflicting rules in CO and Cl, a conflicting core imposes a strict structure on 
a given minimal conflicting set. 
It is only with Definition 10 that we distinguish default from strict rules, in that we 
eliminate members of Ro from min( C) and max( C). In Section 4.2 we show that this 
is a convenience only, in that if we included members of Ro in min( C) and max( C) we 
would simply introduce redundant elements into our default theory. However, consider 
informally the effect of strict rules in Definition 10. For example, the rules B -+ F and 
P + 1F yield the conflicting core ({B -+ F}, {P + TF}) in our example ( 1). This 
induces the following structure on the minimal conflicting set C given in (5), (6): 
min(C) = {B + F}, 
max(C) = {P 4 ‘F}, 
inf(C) = {P * B}. 
(13) 
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Observe that we obtain the same conflicting core for C’ in (3), where P =+ B is 
treated defeasibly by means of P 4 B. That is, the applicability of P --+ B (or 
P + B) is irrelevant to the conflict between B 4 F and P -+ -F, and so can be 
applied independently of these last two defaults. However things are quite different if 
we replace B -+ F or P + -F by their strict counterpart. In the theory 
for example, there is no conflict. If P is true or if P A B is true, then it logically follows 
that TF is true, and so we cannot “apply” the default rule B + F, regardless of the 
“target” formalism. On the other hand, in the theory 
we lose our specificity difference. If P is true, then application of P + B (regardless of 
how this is done) immediately blocks P -+ -F and application of P + -F immediately 
blocks P -+ B. 
In the extended example of Section 2 the conflicting cores are 
Co: ({An+ +e}, {B -+ Fe}), 
c’ : ({B -+ F}, {P + +}), 
c2 : ({B + F},{E+ +‘}), 
c3 : ({B -+ Fe},{Pt -+ 7Fe}), 
c4 : ({An+ WB},{P~+TWB}), 
respectively. As anticipated in Section 2, we thus obtain the following structure for 
minimal conflicting set C4 (given as a Z-ordering in (7) ) : 
min(C4) = {An + WB}, 
max(C4) = {Pt + TWB}, 
inf(C4) = {B + An, Pt -+ B}. 
The remaining sets mau( C’),min(C’), and inf(C’) are constructed in the obvious way. 
For a complement consider the example given in (8)) (9), where the conflicting core 
contains two minimal and one maximal conflicting rules: 
({A -+ lB,C + 7D},{A/\C -+ BVD}). 
That is, min(C) = {A ---f -B,C -+ lD}, mux(C) = {AAC + BVD}, and inf(C) = 8. 
A conflicting core need not necessarily exist for a specific minimal conflicting set. 
For example, consider the minimal conflicting set (expressed as a Z-order): 
Co={Q-P,R+lP}, 
C, = {Q A R ---f PA}. 
Thus Quakers are pacifists while republicans are not; Quakers that are republicans are 
politically active. Here the conflict is between two defaults at the same level (viz. 
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Q -t P and R --f -P) that manifests itself when a more specific default is given. In 
such a case, according to Definition 10, there is no conflicting core. We do have the 
following result however. 
Theorem 11. For a minimal conjicting set C in a set of rules R, if {q A pr 1 r E 
min(C)} F I and { q. A pr ) r E max( C ) } p I then C has a conjlicting core. 
Note that while in “normal” cases a minimal conflicting set (apparently) has a unique 
conflicting core, this is not always the case. Consider the following minimal conflicting 
set: 
We have two conflicting cores, since 
This example is the only one that we have been able to construct in which there is a 
nonunique conflicting core. In the sequel, for simplicity we restrict our attention to min- 
imal conflicting sets having a unique conflicting core. Nonunique conflicting cores are 
easily handled in Definition 13 by considering each minimal conflicting set/conflicting 
core pair separately. 
4. Compiling specificity into consistency-based approaches 
In the previous section, we described how to isolate minimal sets of rules that contain 
conflicting rules with differing specificity. We also showed how to isolate specific mini- 
mal and maximal conflicting rules. In this section, we use this information for specifying 
blocking conditions or, more generally, priorities among conflicting defaults in default 
logic. 
There are two obvious approaches. First, we could determine a strict partial order on a 
set of rules RD from the minimal conflicting sets in R. That is, for two rules r, r’ E RD, 
we can define r < r’ iff r E min(C) and r’ E max( C) for some minimal conflicting 
set C in R. In this way, r < r’ is interpreted as “r is less specific than r”‘. Then, one 
could interpret each rule ff --+ p in RD as a normal default y and use one of the 
approaches developed in [ 21 or [ 81 for computing the extensions of ordered normal 
default theories, i.e., default theories enriched by a strict partial order on rules. Such an 
approach has the disadvantage that it steps outside the machinery of default logic for 
computing extensions. 
This motivates our primary approach, one that remains inside the framework of classi- 
cal default logic, where we transform rules with specificity information into semi-normal 
default theories. After an introduction to default logic we develop this latter approach 
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and explore its properties. Following this we compare our approach with that of related 
approaches in default logic. Lastly, we show how this approach can be applied to other 
consistency-based approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. 
4.1. Default logic 
In default logic, classical logic is augmented by default rules of the form 2. Even 
though almost all “naturally occurring” default rules are normal, i.e., of the form 7, 
semi-normal default rules of the form * are required for establishing precedence in 
the case of “interacting” defaults [ 431 Gee below). Default rules induce one or more 
extensions of an initial set of facts. Given a set of facts W and a set of default rules D, 
any such extension E is a deductively closed set of formulas containing W such that, 
for any % E D, if a E E and +3 $Z E then w E E. One of the simplest definitions of 
an extension, due to [42], is the following: 
Definition 12. Let (D, W) be a default theory and let E be a set of formulas. Define 
Eo = W and for i 3 0, 
Then E is an extension for (D, W) if E = Ui”, Ei. 
The above procedure is not constructive since E appears in the specification of Ei+l . 
In terms of our specification of default theories, we assume that a default theory is 
given by ( (RD, RN), W) whereas in default logic it is given by a pair (D’, W’). The 
ndive translation for default logic is to identify the set of defeasible rules RD with the 
set of normal default rules 
while the strict rules in RN are interpreted as material implications 
R; = {a > /I 1 a + ,d E RN}. 
In this way, a world description ((RD, RN), W) may be transformed into a default theory 
Consider our example (1) along with the fact that P is true; this can be expressed 
as: 
B:F B:W P:TF 
F’W’T > 
(14) 
We obtain two extensions: one in which P, B, W, and F are true and another in which 
P, B, W, and TF are true. Intuitively we want only the last extension, since the more 
J.P. Delgrande. ZH. Schaub/Art@cial Intelligence 90 (1997) 301-348 319 
specific default F should take precedence over the less specific default y. The 
usual solution, originally proposed in [43], is to establish a precedence among these 
two interacting defaults by adding the negation of the exception, P, to the justification 
of the less specific default rule. This amounts to replacing y by v which yields 
the desired result, a single extension containing P, B, W, and TF. 
4.2. Z-default theories 
This section describes translation for producing a standard semi-normal default theory 
that provably maintains specificity. The transformation is succinctly defined: 
Definition 13. Let R = (RD, RN) be a generic world description and let (C’)ic, be the 
family of all minimal conflicting sets in R. For each r E Ro, we define 
6, = 
Q,r : Pr A ArtERr (w 3 &I) 
Pr 
where R,. = {r’ E mux( C’) ) r E min( C’) for i E I}. 
We define DR = {&I r E Ro}. 
(15) 
In what follows, we write DRI = (6, 1 r E R’} for any subset R’ of RD. Any default 
theory obtained according to the above transformation will be referred to as a Z-default 
theory. 
The most interesting point in the preceding definition is the formation of the justifica- 
tions of the (sometimes) semi-normal defaults. Given a rule r, the justification of 8,. is 
built by looking at all minimal conflicting sets, C’, in which r occurs as a least specific 
rule (i.e., r E min(C’)). Then, the consequent of r is conjoined with the strict counter- 
parts of the most specific rules in the same sets (viz. (cyrt > &) for r’ E mm(C’)). 
These rules are put together in R,. In this way, R, contains all rules that conflict with 
r while being more specific than r. Hence, for the minimal conflicting rules we obtain 
semi-normal defaults; all other defaults are normal (since then R, = 0). So for any min- 
imal conflicting set C in R, we transform the rules in min( C) into semi-normal defaults, 
whereas we transform the rules in in&C) Urnax into normal defaults, provided that 
they do not occur elsewhere as a minimal conflicting rule. 
Consider our initial example in (1). There, we obtain a single minimal conflicting 
set C given in (5)) (6), having a unique conflicting core. As shown in ( 13), the 
latter induces the minimal and maximal conflicting rules: min( C) = {B + F} and 
mux( C) = {P + -JF}. According to Definition 13, we obtain for the defeasible rules 
in (1): 
RB-+F = {P -+ lF}, R~--tw=@r RP -+7F =0. 
In turn, these sets induce the following default rules: 
~B-+F = 
B:FA(P>lF) s B:W P : 7F 
F ' 
B-W=- 
w' 
SP 
jTF=-T-' 
The first rule can be simplified to v. 
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Given an entire world description (( Rn , RN), W), we can apply Definition 13 in order 
to obtain Z-default theory (DR. W U R;J). Our initial example along with the contingent 
fact that P is true is then translated into the following Z-default heory: 
B:FATP B:W P:TF 
F ‘W’-q- 
,{P}U{PxB} . 
> 
As opposed to the naive translation given in ( 14), this theory yields only the single, 
specificity preserving extension, in which P, B, W, and -F are true. 
In the extended example of Section 2 the conflicting cores for (3) and (4) are 
({B -+ F},{P -+ lF}) and ({B + F},{E+ TF}) 
respectively. According to Definition 13, we get 
RB_,F = (P --+ -E E + TF), RP-B = 8, RP -+lF =0. 
The first set expresses the fact that the rule B -+ F conflicts with the two more specific 
rules in {P + -F, E -+ -F}. This results in a single semi-normal default rule 
B:FA(P>TF)A(E>-F) or B:FATPATE 
F F * 
Observe that we obtain 7 and 9 for P --+ B and P -+ TF since these rules do not 
occur elsewhere as minimal rules in a conflicting core. 
These examples uggest hat we might simply add the negation of the antecedent of
the higher-level conflicting conditional. However this strategy does not work whenever 
a minimal conflicting set has more than one minimal conflicting rule. We defer the 
discussion to Section 4.3. 
For a more general example, consider the case where, given a rule r, R, is a singleton 
set containing a rule I’. Thus r is less specific than r’. This results in the default rules 
Our intended interpretation is that r and rf conflict, and that r’ is preferable over r 
(because of specificity). Thus, assume that fir and &, are not jointly satisfiable. Then, 
the second default takes precedence over the first one whenever both prerequisites are 
derivable (i.e., LY, E E and art E E) and both pr and /?,.t are individually consistent 
with the final extension E (i.e., lpr $ E and -+,., $ E). That is, while the justification 
of the second default is satisfiable, the justification of the first default, & A (c+t > &l), 
is unsatisfiable. 
In general, we obtain the following results. GD(E, D) stands for the generating 
defaults of E with respect o D, i.e. 
Note that Theorem 14 is with respect o the general theory of minimal conflicting sets 
while Theorem 15 is with respect o the specific development involving conflicting cores. 
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Theorem 14. Let (( RLJ, RN), W) be a world description with R = (Ro, RN). Let c 
be a minimal conjicting set in R. Let E be a consistent extension of (DR, W u R;;). 
Then, 
( 1) if Dma(c) U Dinf(c)nRD C GD(E, D> then Dmin(c) $l GD( E, D), 
(2) ifDmirz(c) U Dinf(C)nRo C GD(E, D) then Dma(c) $l GD( E, D). 
As with Theorems 6, 7, and 8, the last result refers to the more abstract conception 
of minimal conflicting sets, as described in Definition 5. The above theorem then can be 
seen as naturally extending these results to default logic. Observe that only the defeasible 
rules in inf( C) are transformed into default rules; the strict rules in i@(C) are dealt 
with via RG. 
Let us relate this theorem to the underlying idea of specificity. Observe that in the 
first case, where Drnax(c) U Dinfc~)“RD C GD(E, D), we also have 
Prereq(min(C)) C E 
by Theorem 6. That is, even though the prerequisites of the minimal conflicting defaults 
are derivable, they do not contribute to the extension at hand. This is so because some 
of the justifications of the minimal conflicting defaults are not satisfied. In this way, 
the more specific defaults m Drnuxcc) take precedence over the less specific defaults in 
Dmin(c). Conversely, in the second case, where Dmin(C) U DinfiC)nRD & GD(E, D), the 
less specific defaults apply only if the more specific defaults do not contribute to the 
given extension. 
As regards the specific type of minimal conflicting sets induced by the notion of a 
conflicting core, we obtain the following result. 
Theorem 15. Let ((Ro, RN), W) b e a world description with R = (Ro, RN). Let 
(min(C), max( C)) be the conflicting core of some minimal con..icting set C in R. 
Let E be a consistent extension of ( DR, W U R;t). Then, 
(1) ifDmax(c) C GD(E,D) then Dmin(C) $Z GD(E,D), 
(2) lfDmin(C) C GD(E,D) then Dmox(c) g GD(E, 0). 
Thus in this case we obtain that the defaults in a conflicting core are not applicable, 
independent of the “linking defaults” in Diafcc)nRo and inf(C) n RN. 
The following theorem gives an alternative characterisation for extensions of Z-default 
theories. In particular, it clarifies further the effect of the set of rules R, associated with 
each rule r. Recall that in general, however, such extensions are computed in the classical 
framework of default logic. 
Theorem 16. Let ((Ro, RN), W) b e a world description and let E be a set offormulas. 
Let 
(and R, and DR as in Definition 13). 
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Define EO = W U R$ and for i > 0, 
Ei+l = Th( Ei) 
Then, E is an extension of ( DR, W U Ri) iff E = IJE Et. 
It is interesting to note that in determining minimal conflicting sets and conflicting 
cores, the only place where we distinguish elements of RN from Ro is in the formation 
of a conflicting core. We claimed in Section 3.3 that, for the definition of a conflicting 
core, the reference to Ro is present only to eliminate redundant terms; otherwise we 
obtain the same default theory. Now that we have the final translation into default logic 
we can formalise this claim: a mixed confhcting core has the same definition as a 
conflicting core, except that we replace conditions (1) and (2) in Definition 10 by 
(1) min(C) 2 CO, 
(2) max(C> 2 Cl. 
Then, we have the following result. 
Theorem 17. Let ((Ro, RN), W) b e a world description with R = (RD, RN). Then E is 
an extension of the corresponding Z-default heory ifs E is an extension of the default 
theory obtained in transformation ( 15) but making appeal to mixed conJIicting cores. 
4.3. Discussion of Z-default heories 
We illustrate the approach further first with an example from [ 191, studied in detail 
by Etherington and Reiter in [ 181, and second, with an example involving two minimal 
conflicting rules. First, we have the following rules (represented by the figure below the 
rules) : 
l Molluscs are normally shell-bearers. 
l Cephalopods must be Molluscs but normally are not shell-bearers. 
l Nautili must be Cephalopods and must be shell-bearers. 
This results in the following generic world description: 
Rb={M +S,C+7s}, 
Rn={C+M,N+C,N+S}. 
We obtain a single minimal conflicting set C, here expressed as a Z-order: 
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co = {M --f S}, 
C,={C+1S,C*M}. 
The minimal conflicting set contains the conflicting core: 
({M --+ S},{C --f ‘S}). 
As a result, we get: RM-+s = {C ---f 1s). 
Now, given the contingent fact N, we obtain the following default theory: 
M:SA(C>G) c:Ts 
s ‘_s ,{N}U{C>M,N>C,N>S} . > 
(16) 
The semi-normal default can be simplified to y. The default theory in ( 16) has a 
unique extension in which a Nautilus N is also a Cephalopod C, a Mollusc M, and a 
shell-bearer S. 
Interestingly, default theory ( 16) is not equivalent to that obtained in [ 181. Where they 
have the semi-normal default “7s~~‘s) we have the normal default 9. However, 
due to the necessary knowledge N > S, which is present in all initial sets of facts W, 
these defaults are equivalent in that one is applicable whenever the other is. Hence our 
approach avoids the introduction of a redundant semi-normal default. Of course if we 
replaced the necessary implication N + S with its default counterpart N -+ S we would 
obtain a second minimal conflicting set and a second conflicting core, and so in this case 
obtain the semi-normal default. Observe too that there is a second minimal conflicting 
set, given by the rules C + G, N + C, and N + S, which is ruled out, however, due 
to its lack of a conflicting core. 
Etherington and Reiter start from a network representation comprising “hard’, “de- 
fault” and “exception links”. That is, while their network contains “default links” cor- 
responding to M ---f S and C + G, both require so-called “exception links” indicating 
that Cephalopods, C, are exceptions to the first default while Nautili, N, are exceptions 
to the second. These “default links” along with their “exception links” are translated into 
semi-normal default rules. In this way, the exceptional cases are encoded in the network 
representation “by hand” in advance. In contrast, we start from a rule-based represen- 
tation distinguishing strict and defeasible rules; no exceptions are specified. Conflicting 
default rules are automatically detected by the techniques developed in Section 3 and 
then mapped onto a semi-normal default theory. 
Consider next example (8), (9), where we have a minimal conflicting set with more 
than one minimal conflicting rule. 
Ro={A+~B,C+-D}, (17) 
R,={AAC--~BVD}. (18) 
If we were to represent this as a normal default theory, as described in Section 4.1, then 
with W = {A, C} we would obtain three extensions, containing {--B, D}, {B, TD}, 
{yB, lD}. The last extension is unintuitive since it prefers the two less specific rules 
over the more specific one in RI. 
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The rules in Rc U RI form a minimal conflicting set with two minimal conflicting rules. 
This minimal conflicting set comprises two less specific conflicting rules, a situation 
frequently encountered in multiple inheritance networks. Our approach yields two semi- 
normal defaults 
A:+?A(AAC>BVD) A: -BA(C > D) 
or 
1B TB 
9 
and 
c: TDA(AAC>BVD) C: 1D A (A > B) 
or 
TD 
along with the normal default rule w. Given {A,C}, we obtain only the two 
more specific extensions, containing {TB, D} and {B, lD}. In both cases, we apply the 
most specific rule, along with one of the less specific rules. 
Note that if we add either only the negated antecedent of the maximal conflicting rule 
(viz. TA v -C) or all remaining rules (e.g. C > 1D and A A C > B V D in the case of 
the first default) to the justification of the two semi-normal defaults, then in both cases 
we obtain justifications that are too strong. For instance, for A + 7B we would obtain 
either 
A: lBA(lAV-C) A: ~BA(AAC>BVD)A(C>TD) 
-B 
or 
7B 
, 
both of which simplify to T. Given {A, C, D} there is, however, no reason 
the rule A 4 TB should not apply. In contrast, our construction yields the default 
A: 7BA(C 3 D) 
why 
which blocks the second semi-normal default rule in a more subtle way, and additionally 
allows us to conclude TB from {A, C, D}. 
We now examine the formal properties of Z-default theories. In regular default logic, 
many appealing properties are only enjoyed by restricted subclasses. For instance, normal 
default theories guarantee the existence of extensions and enjoy the property of semi- 
monotonicity whereas semi-normal default theories do not. Transposed to our case, semi- 
monotonicity stipulates that if R’ G R for two sets of rules, then if E’ is an extension 
of ( DR,, W) then there is an extension E of ( DR, W) where E’ C E. Arguably, this 
property is not desirable if we want to block less specific defaults in the presence of more 
specific defaults, In fact, this property does not hold for Z-default theories. For instance, 
from the rules B -+ F, P + B, we obtain the defaults $!, y. Given P, we conclude 
B and F. However, adding the rule P -+ TF makes us add default &$ and replace 
default y by v. Obviously, the resulting theory does not support our initial 
conclusions. Rather we conclude now B and TF, which violates the aforementioned 
notion of semi-monotonicity.9 
9 This differs from the notion of semi-monotonicity described in [42 ] The latter is obtained by replacing R 
and DR by D and R’ and DRI by D’. 
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The existence of extensions is not guaranteed for Z-default theories. Consider the 
rules: 
AA& --f -P, BAR + -Q, CAP + TR, 
A + p, B + Q, C --+ R. 
Each column gives a minimal conflicting set in which the upper rule is more specific 
than the lower rule. We obtain the rules 
AAQ:-P BAR:7& CAP:TR 
TP ’ -Q ’ TR ’ 
A:PAyQ B:QATR C:RATP 
P ) Q ’ R ’ 
Given A, B ,C, we get no extension, 
Arguably, the nonexistence of extensions indicates certain problems in the underlying 
set of rules. Zhang and Marek [46] show that a default theory has no extension iff it 
contains certain “abnormal” defaults; these can be detected automatically. However, we 
can also avoid the nonexistence of extensions by translating rules into variants of default 
logic that guarantee the existence of extensions, as discussed in Section 4.5.2. 
Another important property is cumulativity. The intuitive idea is that if a theorem is 
added to the premises from which it was derived, then the set of derivable formulas 
should remain unchanged. This property is only enjoyed by prerequisite-free normal 
default theories in regular default logic. It does not hold for Z-default theories, as the 
next example illustrates. Consider the rules {D + A, A + B, B -+ TA}. The last two 
rules form a minimal conflicting set. Transforming these rules into defaults, yields y, 
A:B B:lAA(A>B) - or in the last case y. Given D, there is one extension containing 
{$:A, B}yAHenck this extension contains B. Now, given D and B, we obtain a second 
extension containing {D, lA, B}. This violates cumulativity. (Note in passing that in 
this case we obtained a normal default theory from the original set of rules. This is 
intuitively plausible, since the two conflicting defaults are mutually canceling, i.e., if 
one applies then the other does not.) 
Lastly we show that the translation to obtain Z-default theories does not simply 
reduce the number of extensions obtained in the corresponding normal default theory 
but may also provide different conclusions. Consider the following world description, 
where P ---f S stands for “penguins swim”. 
~=(({B+F;B~WPPS},{P~B,F~~S}),{PA~S}). 
While ndive transformation (14) yields normal default theory 
B:F B:W P:S 
- 
-T-‘-iv-’ s 
,{P>B,F>+}U{PA+} , 
> 
transformation (15) results in a Z-default theory 
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From the ntive theory, we get an extension containing P, B, W and -S, F. In contrast, 
our translation yields an extension including P, B, W and -S only; no mention is made 
of F. This shows that Z-theories do not simply eliminate extensions obtained through the 
naive transformation; they may even supply us with different conclusions. Intuitively, our 
Z-theories have a conservative attitude towards inheritance over conflicting properties. 
While there is inheritance of the uncontroversial property W, this is not the case for 
the controversial property F, which is usually not enjoyed by penguins regardless of 
swimming ability. 
4.4. An alternative translation into default logic 
In Reiter’s default logic, a default rule Q + p is informally interpreted as “if LY then 
by default /3”. However we can also interpret a rule as “by default, if (Y then p’. In 
this case it is the conditional that is concluded by default, and not the consequent in 
the presence of the antecedent. In this second interpretation, we turn rules like (Y + 
p into prerequisite-free default rules: for translating rules along with their specificity 
into prerequisite-free default theories, we replace the definition of 8, in Definition 13 
by 
(19) 
With this transformation, our birds example in ( 1) together with the knowledge that P 
is true yields default theory 
:(B>F)A(P>-F) :B>W :P>TF 
B>F ’ B>W’ P>TF 
,~P~U~P>B~ 
From this theory, we obtain a single extension containing {e -E B, W}. 
As discussed in [ 151, the problem of controlling interactions among such prerequisite- 
free default rules is more acute than in the regular case. Consider our initial example ( 1) 
and turn the implication P 3 B into its default counterpart P -+ B. The usual transla- 
tion, ignoring specificity information, translates this into the following prerequisite-free 
default rules: 
:B>F :B>W :P>B :P>lF 
B>F’ BxW’ P>B’ PI-F’ 
(20) 
Given P, we obtain three extensions, containing {P, -F, B, W}, {e E B, W}, and 
{e-E TB}. lo In the regular default theory (with prerequisites) we obtain just the 
first two extensions. Clearly, transformation (19) eliminates the second extension. The 
third extension however remains; moreover this extension hinders property inheritance, 
since we cannot conclude that birds have wings. This is caused by the contrapositive 
of B + F. That is, once we have derived TF, we derive TB by contraposition, which 
prevents us from concluding W. 
‘” The third extension would not be present if P + B were a strict rule. 
J.P. Delgrande, CH. Schaub/Artijcial Intelligence 90 (1997) 301-348 321 
This problem can be addressed in two ways: by strengthening the blocking conditions 
for minimal conflicting rules or by blocking the contrapositive of minimal conflicting 
rules. In the first case, we could turn B -+ F into ‘(B>B!$‘lp by adding the negated 
antecedents of the maximal conflicting rules, here 1P. While this looks appealing, 
we have already seen in Section 4.3 that this is too strong in the presence of multiple 
minimal conflicting rules. To see this, consider the rules given in (8), (9). For A --+ lB, 
we obtain :(A>+)A(-AVX) or :A>(+iA-X) 
A>4 A>+ ’ As argued in Section 4.3, there is no reason 
why A + -B should not be applied given the facts {A, C, D}. Also, in general it does 
not make sense to address a problem stemming from contrapositives by altering the way 
specificity is enforced. Rather we should address an independent problem by means of 
other measures. 
So, in the second case, we turn B + F into ‘(B3F)~!$P’1F) or G. That is, 
we add the consequent of B --f F in order to block its contraposition. As before, we 
add the strict counterparts of the maximal conflicting rules, here P > TF. In the birds 
example, the resulting justification is strengthened as above. In particular, we block the 
contribution of the rule B > F to the final extension if either TF or P is derivable. 
For A --+ TB in (8)) (9)) we now obtain, ‘(A’YB)A1’~~~C’Bv’)) or ‘-‘“^,‘:~“,‘“‘. In 
contrast to the previous proposal, this rule is applicable to the facts {A, C, D}. Moreover, 
this approach is in accord with System Z, where rules are classified according to their 
“forward chaining” behaviour. 
So for translating rules along with their specificity into prerequisite-free default theo- 
ries, we can alternatively replace the definition of 6, in Definition 13 by ” 
Applying this transformation to the set of rules in (20), we obtain: 
: FA?P :B>W :P>B :P>-F 
B>F ’ B>W’ P>B’ P>TF’ 
Now, given P, we obtain a single extension containing {E -E B, W}. 
Note that blocking the contrapositive of minimal conflicting rules is an option outside 
the presented framework. The purpose of the above transformation is to preserve inher- 
itance over default statements such as P ---f B. Inheritance over strict statements, like 
P + B, however can be done without blocking contrapositives. In this case, of course, 
transformation (19) is sufficient. 
Transformations ( 19), (21) offer some interesting benefits, since prerequisite-free 
defaults allow for reasoning by cases and reasoning by contraposition (apart from 
minimal conflicting rules). That is, such defaults behave like classical conditionals unless 
explicitly blocked. However, the counterexamples for semi-monotonicity, cumulativity, 
and the existence of extensions carry over to prerequisite-free Z-default theories. 
‘I Observe that (ar > &) A pr is equivalent topr. 
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4.5. Further translations and comparison with related approaches 
In a manner similar to the approach described in the previous sections, we can compile 
prioritised rules into variants of default logic, including those of [2,6,8], as well as 
Theorist [ 411 and autoepistemic logic [ 361. This is described in the remainder of this 
section, 
4.5.1. Ordered variants of default logic 
At the start of this section we described how to extract a strict partial order from 
a family of minimal conflicting sets for using other approaches (such as [2,8] ) to 
compute extensions of ordered default theories, i.e., theories with a strict partial order 
< on the defaults. In fact, one can view partial orders on rules as a general interface 
between approaches, in that we can also use our approach for compiling ordered normal 
default theories into semi-normal default theories. To this end, we have to incorporate the 
order < into the specification of R, in Definition 13. We do this by associating with each 
normal default 9 a rule cx -+ /3 and define for each such rule r that R: = {r’ 1 r < r’}, 
where < is a strict partial order on the set of rules. Then, we can use transformation 
( 15) to turn ordered normal default theories into semi-normal theories. 
We can now compare how priorities are dealt with in our and the aforementioned 
approaches. In both [2] and [ 81 the iterative specification of an extension in default 
logic is modified. In brief, a default is only applicable at an iteration step (in the 
sense of Definition 12) if a no more specific (or <-greater) default is applicable. l2 
The difference between both approaches (roughly) rests on the number of defaults 
applicable at each step. While Brewka allows only for applying a single default that is 
maximal with respect to a total extension of <, Baader and Hollunder allow for applying 
all <-maximal defaults at each step. 
As a first example, consider the normal default rules 
:A :B B:C A:+2 
A ’ B’ c ’ -c 
(for short 61, 82, Ss, &), along with 84 < 63, taken from [ 31. With no facts Baader 
and Hollunder obtain in their approach one extension containing {A, B, C}. Curiously, 
Brewka obtains an additional extension containing {A, B, X}. In our approach, we 
generate from < a single nonempty set Rz = (833); all other such sets are empty. 
Consequently we replace 84 by 
A: -CA(B>C) A: XATB 
-2 
or 
TC . 
In regular default logic, the resultant default theory yields only the first extension con- 
taining {A, B, C}. So here our approach yields the same result as Baader and Hollunder’s 
approach. 
As a second example, again from [ 31, consider the rules 
I2 In [2,8 1 < is used in the reverse order. 
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:A B : -A :B A : -B - 
A ’ 1A ’ B ’ -B 
329 
(for short St, 62, 83, &), along with 61 < 62, 83 < 64. Baader and Hollunder show 
that in Brewka’s approach two extensions are obtained, one containing {A, ‘B} and 
another containing {TA, B}. However an additional extension is obtained in Baader 
and Hollunder’s approach, containing {A, B}. In our approach, we produce from < the 
nonempty sets R;, = (82) and Rs: = {i&4); all other such sets are empty. Then, we 
replace St and S3 by 
: A A (B > -A) :AA-B 
A 
or 
A 
and 
: B A (A > 7B) :BATA 
B 
or 
B ’ 
which yields only the first two extensions in default logic. Thus, as opposed to the 
previous example, our approach yields here the same result as Brewka’s approach. Even 
though these examples appear to be artificial, they can be extended to express reasonable 
specificity orderings. In all, we observe that in both examples our approach yields the 
fewer and, in terms of specificity, more intuitive extensions. 
Our approach to compiling partial orders into semi-normal default theories assumes 
that priorities are determined by specificity conflicts between rules. Consider where 
we might extract priorities directly from subsumption relations, as is done in [ 21. 
Consider terms stating that “birds fly”, B --+ F, and “young birds need special care”, 
B A Y --+ C, along with the subsumption relation between “birds” and “young birds”. 
This subsumption amounts to a priority between the two rules even though there is 
no conflict: (B -+ F) < (B A Y -+ C). This priority would not be detected in our 
approach, since we rely on there being a conflict between rules to determine priorities. 
In this example there is no minimal conflicting set and so in our approach we would 
obtain the two normal rules y and F. 
The preceding exposition assumed that a rule CY -+ p was associated with a default 
having prerequisite (Y and consequent /3. This view underlies [ 2,8], in that they rely on 
the existence of prerequisites. In contrast, we can treat rules also as strict implications, 
and so compile them into prerequisite-free defaults, as we showed in the last subsection. 
Boutilier [6] proposes an approach based on these intuitions, where a ranking on de- 
faults is obtained from the Z-ordering of the defaults. Boutilier uses the correspondence 
between a conditional CY, + & of System Z and defaults of the form c to produce 
partitioned sets of default rules. For rules in System Z, there is a corresponding set 
of prerequisite-free normal defaults. One can reason in default logic by applying the 
rules in the highest set, and working down. However this means that for reasoning, one 
again steps outside the machinery of default logic. Moreover, since the order in which 
defaults are applied depends on the original Z-ordering, this order may be “upset” by 
the addition of irrelevant conditionals. This in turn may introduce unwanted priorities. 
For this last point, consider again example (8), (9), but where we also have that A is 
exceptional with respect to E for some property A’. We had originally 
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(Ro,R,)=({A+~B,C-,+},{AAC+BvD}) 
and to this we add 
{A -+ 7E,A -+ A’,A’ + E}. 
This yields the Z-ordering, expressed as a union of sets to clarify the structure: 
R. = {C + ‘D} u {A’ + E}, 
Intuitively A’ and E have nothing to do with the original theory, yet their addition 
has “moved” A + -B from Ro to RI. In Boutilier’s approach we would conclude 1B 
and D from {A, C}, and would not get the second extension as in the original case. 
Hence adding irrelevant defaults leads to different extensions wrt applying the original 
three defaults. This phenomenon clearly is avoided in the present approach, due to our 
use of minimal conflicting set and not the full Z-ordering. 
4.5.2. Other variants of default logic 
Another alternative is the translation into variants of default logic that guarantee the 
existence of extensions [ 7,15,33]. This can be accomplished by means of both transla- 
tion ( 15) and ( 19), (21) . Moreover, the resulting Z-default theories enjoy cumulativity 
when applying translation (15) and (19), (21) in the case of cumulative default logic 
and when applying translation ( 19), (21) in the case of constrained default logic. The 
corresponding results can be found in [7,15]. Although none of these variants enjoys 
semi-monotonicity with respect to the underlying conditionals, they all enjoy this prop- 
erty with respect to the default rules. As shown in [7], this may lead to problems in 
blocking a rule, like v, in the case TP is a default conclusion. For details see [ 71. 
For the translation into Theorist, we refer the reader to [ 151, where it is shown that 
Theorist systems correspond to prerequisite-free default theories in constrained default 
logic and vice versa. Accordingly, we may obtain a Theorist system from a set of 
prioritised rules by first applying transformation (19), (21) and then that given in [ 151 
for translating prerequisite-free default theories in constrained default logic into Theorist. 
4.5.3. Autoepistemic logic 
Autoepistemic logic [ 361 aims at formalising an agent’s reasoning about her own 
beliefs. To this end, the logical language is augmented by a modal operator L where a 
formula La is read as “a is believed”. For a set W of such formulas, an autoepistemic 
extension E is defined as 
As discussed in [ 271, we can express “birds fly” either as B A TLTF > F or LB A 
TLTF > F. Given B and one of these rules, we obtain in both cases an extension 
containing F. Roughly speaking, the former sentence corresponds to the default s 
while the latter is close to y. 
J.P Delgrande, TH. Schaub/Art$cial Intelligence 90 (1997) 301-348 331 
This motivates the following translations into autoepistemic logic. Let R be a set of 
rules and let R, C R (as given in Definition 13) ; for each r E R we define: 
pr=cu,A?LT 
( 
PrA A (a,, 3&O 3Pr5 
r’ER, 1 
@- = La, A TLT 
( 
&A A( ffrf 1 Pr,) 1 Pr. 
l.‘ER, ) 
Applying the first transformation to our initial example, we obtain for B ---f F the modal 
sentence 
BA-TLT(FA(PITF))>F or BATL-I(FA-IP)>E 
along with BATLTW > W, PATLTB > B, and PATLF > -F for B + W, P -+ B, 
and P -+ YF. Now, given P along with the four modal defaults, we obtain a single 
autoepistemic extension containing -IF and W. In this way, we have added specificity 
to autoepistemic logic while preserving inheritance. 
5. Compiling specificity into minimisation-based approaches 
5. I. Circumscription 
Circumscription was introduced by John McCarthy in [34,35] as an approach to 
formalising diverse nonmonotonic aspects of commonsense reasoning. The idea behind 
circumscription is that of “logical minimisation”. A formula LY follows from a theory W 
by circumscription if cx is true in all models of W that are minimal in a certain sense. In 
applications to default reasoning, circumscription is used to minimise “abnormalities” 
of default rules. For this purpose, the language is enriched by abnormality propositions 
designated abl , ab2, . . . . These propositions address cases exceptional to a default rule 
at hand. In this way, a default statement like “birds fly” is represented as a classical 
implication of the form B A yab > F. Following this general principle, we transform a 
set of default rules into a set of implications. For a generic world description (RD, RN), 
we define 
R$b = {ar A Tab, 3 pr 1 a, --+ pr E RD}; (22) 
R; = far 3 Pr 1 a, =+ Pr E RN}. (23) 
As an example, consider the following simplification of our initial example in (2): 
(RD, RN) = ({B + E P --$ lF}, {P + B}). (24) 
For RD, we obtain: 
RLb = (B A Tab, > E P A Tab2 > TF}. 
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The strict rule in RN becomes R;Y = {P 3 B}. Now, the set of rules in R”k U R;J can be 
seen as a description of our birds scenario in (24) in standard propositional logic. How- 
ever, we also want to express that things are considered as normal as possible-provided 
that there is no evidence to the contrary. This assumption is formally accomplished by 
circumscribing a world description: let W be a propositional formula, and PUZ a par- 
tition of all atoms in W. The circumscription of P in W while varying Z is defined as 
(cf. [32,34]) 
Circum(W; P;Z) = w A {VP’,Z’ (W[P/P’,Z/Z’] A (P’ 3 P) 3 (P 3 P'))) . 
In this formula, P’ and Z’ are disjoint sets of new propositional variables corresponding 
to those in P and Z. That is, P’ = {p’ 1 p E P} and Z’ = {z’ 1 z E Z}. The 
formula W [ P/P’, Z/Z’] denotes the result obtained by replacing in W all occurrences 
of variables in P U Z by their counterparts in P’ U Z’. (P’ > P) and (P 3 P’) 
abbreviate ApEP (p’ > p) and ApEP(p > p’), respectively. The net result is that the 
circumscription axiom asserts that the number of atoms in P that are true is as small as 
possible. Furthermore, in achieving this minimisation, the truth values of atoms in Z are 
allowed to vary. The semantical underpinnings for circumscription are given by minimal 
models. For interpretations I3 M and N, we define M <(p;z) NifMnPgNnP. 
Then, according to [ 321, M is a model of Circum( W; P; Z) iff M is minimal among 
all models of W with respect to <(p;z). 
Consider our birds example in (24) along with fact P. The models of {P}, R$, and 
R$, where we just list the positive literals, are the following: 
{P,&Eab1,ab2}, {P,&~h4b2}, {P,B,Eab:!}, {m,abl}. (25) 
Circumscribing propositions ubl and ubz while varying B, F ,P amounts to reasoning 
with respect to those models in (25) that have the fewest abnormality propositions. 
There are two such minimal models, {P, B, ubl} and (p1 B, E ub2). As a consequence, 
we cannot conclude much more than from the original world description in (24). That 
is, we have 
In particular, we cannot derive ubl, ub2, or F, nor their negation. This shows that 
circumscription does not respect the principle of specificity. This shortcoming was ob- 
served in [35]. For fixing this problem, McCarthy introduced a prioritised version of 
circumscription by assuming that abnormality propositions are a priori assigned different 
priorities. However, in this approach specificity is handled on the me&level by iterat- 
ing circumscription on certain priority layers (and so by extrasystematic means). We 
examine this approach in Section 5.3. 
5.2. Z-circumscription theories 
We address the lack of specificity by providing axioms reflecting the precedence 
of more specific rules over less specific rules. We accomplish this, again, by taking 
I3 We represent interpretations a sets of atoms. 
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advantage of the specificity information provided by minimal conflicting sets. This 
information is encoded by means of axioms that express precedences among default 
rules conflicting because of differing specificity. I4 
Definition 18. Let R = (RD, RN) be a generic world description. Let (C’) iEl be the 
family of all minimal conflicting sets in R. We define 
where R,. = {r’ E mux(C’) 1 r- E min(C’) for i E I}. 
This definition provides a circumscription policy for specificity using standard circum- 
scription, rather than prioritised circumscription [35]. Observe that rules like 
1 /j\r,ER ( (Y,.I > &I) > ab, have the form of inheritance cancellation axioms as de- 
scribed in [ 351. Note that necessary rules are discarded in the formation of antecedents 
of specificity axioms, since they constitute true sentences in the world description ob- 
tained by adding RL. Consequently, a specificity axiom is tautological if R, consists of 
necessary rules only. We detail the effect of specificity axioms below. 
Consider our birds example in (24). As required in Definition 18, we associate with 
each default rule a set of more specific, conflicting default rules extracted from the 
minimal conflicting sets. For the default rules RD in (24)) this yields the following sets 
of default rules according to the specification of R, in Definition 18: 
RB+F = {P -+ TF}, Rp.++ = 8. 
Recall that the first set expresses the fact that P -+ TF is more specific than B --+ F, 
while the second equation tells us that there is no more specific (conflicting) default 
rule than P + -IF. According to Definition 18, we obtain for the default rules RD in 
(24) the following specificity axiom: 
R; = {,(P > -F) > abl}. (27) 
We have omitted the tautology obtained in the case of r = P -t TF. 
Finally, our construction yields the following classical theory in propositional logic 
when applied to our generic world description in (24) : 
R~bUR~UR;J={BA~abl >EP/\-abT>TF} 
U {,(P > -F) > ab,} U {P > B}. (28) 
Together with the contingent fact P, these rules have the following models: 
{P,B,Eah,ab2}, {P,B,dw&}, {P, B,ah}. (29) 
I4 Compare Definition 13. 
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In contrast to the models in (25), we now have only a single minimal model, namely 
{P,B,abl}. Hence, circumscription allows for concluding P, B, abl, and TF, lab2 
from the transformed world description. That is, 
Circum ({P} U Rib U Rg U Rg; {ab,, ab2); {B, F; P}) k P A B A -E 
One might wonder why we compose specificity axioms by taking entire rules and not 
merely their antecedents. This would amount to considering the rule P > abl instead 
of the one given in (27). Interestingly, P > abl is the inheritance cancellation axiom 
suggested in [ 351. Let us illustrate this by regarding again theory (8)) (9)) constituting 
a minimal conflicting set with two less specific conflicting rules: 
Co={A+~B,C+-D}, Ct={AAC-+BVD}. 
Applying the transformations in (22) and (26) yields: 
R”Dh = {(A A labI ) > TB, (C A Tabz) > lD, (A A C A labs) > B V D}, 
Rg={$AAC I BvD) >abt,+AAC >BVD) >ab2}. (30) 
Given {A, C, D}, we observe a single “abnormality minimal” model of the resulting 
world description, namely {A, C, D,abz}. In this way, circumscription allows us to 
conclude 1B. This amounts to applying the first default A -+ -B. Now, let us replace 
the specificity axioms in (30) by 
Rg={AAC >abl,AAC >abx} 
according to the putative recipe described above. We obtain for the world description 
built on the facts {A, C, D) two “abnormality minimal” models, (A, C, D,& ,abz} and 
{A, B, C, D,abl,ab~}. Consequently, we cannot derive -B. Given {A, C, D} there is, 
however, no reason why the default A + TB should not apply. This shows that our 
approach is advantageous over plain blocking conditions. Another advantage of our 
construction is that it allows for an elegant alternative formulation for incorporating 
specificity, as we will see next. 
Observe that the two implications involving P and ?F in (28) can be put together to: 
PA(1ab2Vlabl) 1-S (31) 
This indicates that we can alternatively modify the more specific rules instead of adding 
axioms referring to the least specific ones. As a general result, the next definition 
provides us with an alternative but more compact translation of default rules, along with 
their specificity information, into classical logic: 
Definition 19. Let R = (RD, RN) be a generic world description. Let ( C’)~Q be the 
family of all minimal conflicting sets in R. We define 
RZ, = (a,A (-abrVr$-abrf) I&) NERD} 
where RF = {Y’ E min( C’) 1 r E max( C’) for i E I}. 
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This transformation unifies those given in (22) and (26). This is accomplished by 
slightly extending transformation (22) in the case of more specific conflicting default 
rules. To this end, we extend the abnormality condition of more specific default rules 
by disjoining the abnormality propositions of the less specific default rules. This yields 
for our generic world description in (24) the following set of strict rules: 
This result should be compared with that obtained in (28). Note furthermore that Ri 
reverses the roles of min( C’) and mo_x( C’) in the specification of R, in Definition 18. 
The next theorem tells us that the constructions are in fact equivalent: 
Theorem 20. Let (Ro, RN) be a generic world description. Then, Rtb U Rg U Ri is 
logically equivalent to R*, U Rk. 
We further study the effect of our approach by means of a general but simple example. 
Consider a generic world description comprising two conflicting rules r and r’ and 
suppose that r is more specific than r’. Hence, we have RL = {r’} and we obtain in turn 
cy, A (Tab, V Tabrl ) > & and LYLE A lab,! > &I. 
Our intended interpretation is that r is preferable over r’ (because of specificity) when- 
ever r and r’ are both potentially “applicable”. Assume that & and prj are not jointly 
satisfiable, since r and r’ conflict. Then, the first default takes precedence over the 
second whenever both antecedents, LY, and LYLE, are derivable. This is so because of the 
following reasons: Clearly, {a,, ffrt, Pr, &} is no “abnormality minimal” model, since 
fir and p,.! are not jointly satisfiable. Also, 
{ c+,+,,&,G}, {a,,~r+b,,P,}, {ar,ar’,&}, 
{ a,, ar’ , &I, Pr, } , {Q, , art , a&} 
are not “abnormality minimal” models, since they either falsify (Y, A ( Tab, V Tab,, ) > pr 
or (Ye/ Alab*/ > p,., . Finally, there remain three candidates satisfying a single abnormality 
proposition: 
{ ~r,~r~,ab,,P,,P,I}, {(Yr,ffri,ab,l,P,,P,I}, {ar,ar/,ab,~,P,}. 
In fact, these three models are “abnormality minimal”. Since all of them satisfy P,., they 
prefer the more specific default r over r’. 
In analogy to Theorems 14 and 15, we have the following general results. Theorem 21 
is with respect to the general theory of minimal conflicting sets while Theorem 22 is 
with respect to the specific development involving conflicting cores. 
Theorem 21. Let ((Ro, RN), W) b e a world description with R = (RD, RN). Let C be 
a minimal conjlicting set in R. Then, 
(1) ifCircum(WURgUR;G;{ab, IKE Ro};Z) ~inf(C)*A(r\rE_(C)~‘Alab,) 
then Circum( W U R*, U Rk; {ab, I r E lb}; Z) p (~\rEmjn~C~ Pr),
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(2) if Circum( W U R*, U R&; {abr 1 r E RD}; Z> b W(C)* A (l\rEmin(C) Pr> Gael 
Circum( W U R*, U R;J; {abr I r E RD}; Z) k (&mx.Cj w A l&l, 
where Z is the set of all propositional variables in W RD, RN. 
In the first case, we have that 
Circum (W U R*, U RG; {ab, 1 r E Ro}; Z) + 
by Theorem 6. So though the prerequisites of the minimal conflicting defaults are deriv- 
able, the corresponding rules do not apply. This is so because some of the abnormality 
propositions ab corresponding to the minimal conflicting defaults must hold. In this way, 
the more specific defaults from max(C) take precedence over the less specific defaults 
in min(C). Conversely, in the second case, the less specific defaults apply only if the 
more specific defaults do not contribute to the given extension. 
We also obtain the following result. 
Theorem 22. Let ((Ro, RN), W) be a world description with R = (RD, RN). Let 
(min( C) , max(C) ) be the conflicting core of some minimal conflicting set C in R. 
Then, 
(1) if Circum(W U FD U R&; {abr 1 r E Ro};Z) k (l\rE_(C) a, A labr) then 
Circum( W U R$ U R$; {& 1 r E RD}; Z> k (r\rEmin(C) w A Pr), 
(2) if Circum( W U R*, U R;J; {abr 1 r E RD}; Z) /= (l\r~min(C) (yr A pr), then 
Circum( W U R*, U Rk; {abr 1 r E Rn}; Z) p ( ArEmar Lyr A labr), 
where Z is the set of all propositional variables in W Rb, RN. 
Thus in this case we obtain that the defaults in a conflicting core are not simultane- 
ously applicable, independent of the “linking defaults” from inf( C) . 
Importantly, both transformations are consistency preserving. 
Theorem 23. Let (Ro, RN) be a generic world description such that R;G U Rh is 
satisfiable. Then, R*, U R;J is satisfiable. 
Clearly, the same result applies to our initial approach using the rules in R$bU Rg U Rk. 
Moreover, consistency is also preserved when applying circumscription to specificity 
integrating world descriptions: 
Theorem 24. Let ((Ro, RN), W) b e a world description such that W U R;J is satisfiable. 
Then, Cimum( W U R*, U R;J; {ab, 1 r E Ro}; Z) is satisfiable, where Z is the set of all 
propositional variables in W Rb, RN. 
Thus, unlike standard default logic (and autoepistemic logic; see Section 4.4) in which 
one might obtain incoherent theories, the transformation given for circumscription cannot 
render an original theory incoherent. 
Finally, Theorem 24 provides us with a compact summary of our approach. That is, we 
start from knowledge bases of the form ((Ro, RN), W). Next, we treat the generic part 
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of such a world description by means of techniques developed in Section 3 for isolating 
minimal sets of default rules with specificity conflicts. Then, we take the initial world 
description along with the determined specificity information obtained in the previous 
step and translate it into a classical theory in propositional logic, namely W U PO U R;J. 
In a final step, we compute the resulting conclusions by circumscribing the introduced 
abnormality propositions while varying all propositions in the original world description. 
5.3. Discussion and related work 
McCarthy [ 351 addressed the lack of specificity in circumscription by introducing 
prioritised circumscription. This approach has been further developed in [ 321. The 
idea is to partition the circumscribed propositions into priority layers. For this, a set 
of propositions P is partitioned into disjoint subsets PI 0. . . UP,, where the propo- 
sitions in Pi should take priority over those in Pi+t. For computing the result of 
prioritised circumscription, Lifschitz shows in [32] that any prioritised circumscrip- 
tion, written Circum( W; PI > .f * > P,; Z), can be expressed as a conjunction of 
ordinary circumscriptions. That is, Circum(W; PI > . . . > P,; Z) is equivalent to 
/\y=, Circum( W; Pi; Pi+1 U . . . U P,, U Z). Thus a prioritised circumscription becomes 
a sequence of ordinary circumscriptions where propositions in a higher layer are “min- 
imised” while propositions in a lower layer are varied. This process is iterated over all 
layers in the partition of P. 
In our simple birds example, we could give the abnormality proposition of the more 
specific default rule ab;! priority over the one of the less specific rule abl. This yields 
Circum ({P} U Rsb U Rk; {abz} > {abl}; {B, E P}) 
= Circum ({P} U R$’ U Ri; {abz}; {abl , B, E P}) 
A Circum ({P} U Rgb U R;G; {abl}; {B, F, P}) k P A B A -E 
Observe however that such an approach works only if the partial order induced by speci- 
ficity can be pressed into a “layered format” without introducing unwanted preference 
relations. For instance, [24] gives partial orders that cannot be represented in a “lay- 
ered format”. For similar reasons one usually refrains from mapping a full Z-ordering 
onto “layered structures” in default reasoning systems (see Section 4.5). Finally, the 
iterated format used for computing prioritised circumscription amounts to a treatment 
of specificity on the metalevel, rather than producing an object level theory, as in our 
approach. 
Grosof [ 241 extends prioritised circumscription for dealing with partial orders. In this 
way, his approach allows for formalising partial orders representing specificity informa- 
tion. There are however some important differences to our approach. First, Grosof [ 241 
describes default rules with specificity in terms of an extended prioritised circumscrip- 
tion, while we deal with the basic approach to circumscription. Second, it is (to our 
knowledge) yet unknown how and if Grosof’s extended prioritised circumscription is 
reducible to iterated ordinary circumscriptions. Hence his approach remains outside the 
basic circumscriptive machinery. Consequently, it is impossible to apply, for instance, 
techniques for transforming circumscription in first-order or even propositional logic (see 
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[ 321) . Observe that, in contrast, we deal with a single basic circumscriptive theory that 
allows for applying the aforementioned techniques along with existing implementations 
of circumscriptive theorem provers [ 2 1 ] . 
The choice of circumscription as a target formalism rather than, say, default logic 
or autoepistemic logic, has several benefits. Foremost, we work largely within classical 
logic: a classical theory is generated; there is a circumscriptive step minimising ab sen- 
tences, after which one has a classical knowledge base. Circumscription itself has several 
rather nice features: we don’t have the notion of “extension” to be concerned with; also 
circumscription is cumulative and consistency preserving. Furthermore computational 
properties of circumscription are well studied [ 21,321. 
Circumscription and its variants are by far the best known and best studied 
minimisation-based approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. Consequently we have lit- 
tle to say about other approaches. Predicate completion [lo] for one has seen little 
application to areas of reasoning with default properties. For the closed world assump- 
tions, presumably the only appropriate variant of the original approach is the careful 
closed world assumption [ 171, which is subsumed by parameterised circumscription. 
Hence here the compilation is the same as that given for parameterised circumscription. 
Shoham’s preferential entailment [441, which is based on minimising certain models, 
in fact it has been shown to have strong ties with the conditional logic corresponding to 
S4 and, so in its most general conception, enforces specificity [ 291. 
6. Discussion 
This paper has addressed the issue of incorporating specificity information into those 
approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning where specificity conflicts are not handled as 
part of the basic machinery of the approach; these approaches have generally been 
characterised as either “consistency based” or “minimisation based”. We begin with a 
generic world description expressed as a set of strict and defeasible rules. The end 
result is a default theory expressed in some (consistency-based or minimisation-based) 
formalism, and where conflicts involving differing specificities are resolved. By appeal 
to a theory of defaults, here using the notion of toleration from System Z, specificity 
conflicts are isolated into minimal conflicting sets. From these minimal conflicting sets 
the conflicting rules are determined, and from the specificity information intrinsic in 
these sets, a default theory in a target language in turn is specified. For default logic 
the end result is a semi-normal default theory; in circumscription the end result is 
a set of abnormality propositions that, when circumscribed, yield a theory in which 
specificity information is appropriately handled. While we mainly deal with theories 
expressed (ultimately) in default logic and circumscription, we also address variants of 
these approaches as well as autoepistemic logic and Theorist. Arguably the approach 
is both uniform and general, and so is applicable to any sufficiently rich approach to 
nonmonotonic reasoning that does not “automatically” deal with specificity conflicts. 
This approach is modular, in that we separate the determination of conflicts from 
the redution of conflicts among rules. The approach provides a broadly applicable 
framework, subsuming for example that of [ 431. As well, it generalises related mappings 
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as found for example in [ 181 and, in circumscription, yields a more comprehensive 
form of an inheritance cancellation axiom. This work differs from previous work in 
specifying priorities among default rules (in both default logic and circumscription) in 
that specificity information is obtained from information intrinsic in the rules, rather than 
assumed to exist a priori. In contrast to previous work, the approach avoids stepping 
outside the machinery of the underlying approach. Thus, we deal with the “standard’ 
version of default logic and circumscription, and do not need to rely on prioritised 
versions, as do other approaches. 
With respect to implementation, default reasoning is intractable in the worst case in 
virtually all conceptions. For example there may be an exponential number of specificity 
conflicts in a default theory. Nonetheless our approach would appear to be relatively 
amenable to implementation. First, the fact that we deal with the standard versions of 
default logic and circumscription means that one can make use of existing theorem 
provers in implementing this approach. Second, we have that if a default theory contains 
a minimal conflicting set, then so does any superset of the theory; this then would allow 
an incremental computation of minimal conflicting sets, even in evolving knowledge 
bases. 
7. Proofs of theorems 
In what follows, we use the following function providing the set of negated elements. 
Define for a set of formulas S, 
Let us moreover adopt the convention of using interchangeably a finite set of formulas 
S and the conjunction of its elements AUES (Y on both sides of the entailment relation 
k. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider a minimal conflicting set C and assume the converse, 
that is that C has more than a binary Z-ordering. Then, there is a rule r E C \ (Cc U Ci ) 
such that 
c; u {a, A Pr) 
is unsatisfiable. Consider CO U Cl. Obviously, this set has a nontrivial Z-ordering. This 
is a contradiction to the minimality of C. 0 
Proof of Theorem 4. We have 
{a1 A Pl) u c* 
is unsatisfiable for all q + pi E Cl. 
This implies 
C* t= aI 2 +I 
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for all LL~ -+ /3r E Cl; since (trivially) 
C* + aI 1 PI 
we obtain by reductio ad absurdum that 
c* k 7crr 
for all ~1 -+ /3t E Ct. 0 
Proof of Theorem 6. We have 
&f(C)* U mn(C)* + Prereq(mux(C)) > Prereq(min(C)) 
iff 
inf(C)* U max(C)* UPrereq(mux(C)) U Prereq(min(C)) 
is unsatisfiable. 
Let us assume the latter set is satisfiable. 
We have (trivially) 
Prereq(min(C)) + min(C)*. 
This implies 
inf(C)* U mux(C)* UPrereq(mx(C)) U Prereq(min(C)) + C*. 
But according to Theorem 4, 
C* b Prereq(mm(C)), 
a contradiction! Cl 
Proof of Theorem 7. Let us assume the opposite. That is, 
(R’)* + Prereq(R”) > Prereq(m(C)). 
Or, equivalently, 
(R’)* UPrereq(R”) +Prereq(max(C)). 
According to Theorem 4, 
C* k Prereq(max(C)). 
By monotonicity, 
(I?‘)* UPrereq(R”) k Prereq(mzx(C)). 
Consequently, 
(R’) * U Prereq( R”) 
is unsatisfiable, a contradiction! 0 
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Proof of Theorem 8. We have 
in!(C)* u {a,} /= -(C onseq(min(C)) A Conseq(mux(C))) 
iff 
inf(C)* U {a,} U Conseq(min(C)) U Conseq(mux(C)) 
is unsatisfiable. 
Let us assume the last set is satisfiable. 
Clearly, 
Conseq(min(C)) k min(C)* 
and 
Conseq(max(C)) k mux(C)*. 
This implies 
irzf(C)* U {ar} U Conseq(min(C)) U Conseq(mux(C)) k C*. 
But according to Theorem 4, 
C* + Prereq(max(C)), 
a contradiction (since LY, E Prereq( mux( C) ) ) ! 0 
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Proof of Theorem 9. Given immediately after Theorem 9. 0 
Proof of Theorem 11. Let (CO, Cr ) = C be a minimal conflicting set. 
Since 
c u {a, A Pr} k 1 
for Y E Cr, it must be that 
{%I A P?-J I r-’ E co u Cl > u (6 A Pr} + 1 
or, since r E Cr , {a+ A /$.f 1 r’ E CO U Cr } + 1. 
Since by assumption 
(6 A Pr I r E Co) F 1, 
we can essentially begin with { (Y,. A /?,. 1 r E CO} and add rules from Cr until inconsis- 
tency is obtained. 0 
Proof of Theorem 14. Let R be a set of rules and let W be a set of formulas. Let C 
be a minimal conflicting set in R. Let E be a consistent extension of ( DR, W). 
(1) Let Q,lax(C)UD. rnf(C)nR,, C GD(E, D). By definition of GD( E, D), this implies 
that 
342 J.P. Delgrande, TH. Schaub/Artifcial Intelligence 90 (1997) 301-348 
Since E is deductively closed, we have that 
inf(C)* urnax( C E. 
Assume that D,;,,(c) C GD( E, D). Then, we have that 
Prereq(D,i,(c)) U Conseq(D,;,~~~) C E and min(C)* C E. 
By Theorem 4, we have that 
irzf(C)* Umzx(C>* Umin(C)* UPrereq(D,,,(c)) 
is unsatisfiable. By monotonicity, this implies that E is unsatisfiable, a contra- 
diction 
(2) Analogous to (1). 0 
Proof of Theorem 15. Let R be a set of rules and let W be a set of formulas. Let 
(min( C) , max( C) ) be a conflicting core of some minimal conflicting set C in R. Let 
E be a consistent extension of ( DR, W). 
( 1 ) Let Qllnl(~) _ C GD(E, D). By the definition of GD(E, D), this means that 
Prereq(D,,,,~c)) U Conseq(&,,cc,) C E. 
IfD ,~lm~C~  GD(E, D) then we also have that 
Prereq(D,7zi,(c)) U Con=q(D,i,(c)) C E. 
Since (min( C) , mux( C) ) is a conflicting core, we have 
But this implies that E is unsatisfiable, a contradiction. 
(2) Follows analogously to ( 1). 0 
Proof of Theorem 16. According to [ 421, E is an extension of (D, W) iff E = Ui”, Ei, 
where 
E. = W 
and for i > 0, 
cx:p 
-ED, aEEi, lP#E 
w 
Transposing these definitions to Z-default theories of the form ( DR, W U Rz) yields 
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and (substituting general default rule 9 by the one in Definition 13): 
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where R, is defined as in Definition 13. By relying on the fact that 
(Y, E Ei, 1 PrA A( 
r’ER, 
the last but one equation can be easily transformed into 
which completes our proof. 0 
Proof of Theorem 17. The proof relies on the following two observations: 
( 1) For fixed world knowledge W, if p E W, then adding p to the justification of a 
default will not affect the resulting extensions. 
That is, for any default theory (D, W) if S = 2 and 6’ = e then: 
E is an extension of (D U {a}, W) and 6 E GD( E, D) iff 
E is an extension of (D U {S’}, W) and 6’ E GD(E, D). 
(2) For any (Y, + & E RN, CY, > & will be part of the world knowledge in the 
Z-default theory. 
There are two cases to consider: 
(1) 
(2) 
The 
LY, + & E RN, and cy, + pr E max( C) for conflicting core C. 
Let (Y, -+ p,,, E min( C) (or (Y,, + Pnl E min( C) > . So under the translation we 
will have a default of the form ~“‘P”A~A(ar’a). But by the second observation 
above, LY, > & is also in the world kn8;;wledge of the Z-default theory; by the 
first observation then, the default has precisely the same effect as y. 
cz, + pr E RN, and LY, =+ /!I,. E min(C) for conflicting core C. 
So under the translation we will have a default of the form 9. But by 
the second observation above, cy, > fir is also in the world knowledge of the 
Z-default theory. Hence the default T is only trivially applicable in any 
extension (in that, if cy, is true, then since LYE > pr is also true, we obtain that 
fir is true, without reference to the default). 
result follows by straightforward induction on 1 RN[. 0 
Proof of Theorem 20. Let (RD, RN) be a generic world description. Let us start with 
R$’ U Rg U Rh. Consider 
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where R, = {r’ E max(C’) 1 r E min(C’) for i E I}. 
Since ( C”)iE, is the family of all minimal conflicting sets in R this is equivalent to 
R”” = 
D -A@ I~ 3 &I) 3 & r’ E mux(C’) and r E min(C’) for i E I . 
r,r’ 
More transformations yield in turn: 
Kg)= A 
i 
( LY,J A lab, > &I) r’ E max( C’) and r E min( C’) for i E I , 
i-,rl 
where ?&I = {r E min( Ci) 1 r’ E max( C’) for i E I}. 
Switching r and r’ gives us: 
@={O (rL;T.i..) 3Pr rcRD} 
where RF = {r’ E min(C’) 1 r E mux(C’) for i E I}. 
Recall that 
Rgb = {au, A Tab, > & 1 r E RD}. 
Consequently, we may combine all elements in R”Db with those in the latest equation 
describing R$‘, which gives us: 
where R: = {r’ E min(C’) I r E max(C’) for i E I}. 
As a consequence, we have shown that R’fP U I?; U R;t is transformable into R*, U Rk 
by consecutive application of logical and set-theoretic transformations. 0 
Proof of Theorem 21. Let R be a set of rules and let W be a set of formulas. Let C 
be a minimal conflicting set in R. 
(1) LetMbeamodelof 
Circurn(WUR&UR~;{ab,IrER~};2) 
U inf(C)* U {a, A Tab, I r E max(C)}. 
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Then, M is also a model of {& 1 r E mu-x(C)}; and therefore it also entails 
Wr&c>*. 
Now, assume M is also a mode1 of 
{Pr I r E min(C)}. 
Then, M is also a mode1 of min(C)*. 
By Theorem 4, we have however that 
inf(C>* Urnax( Urnin( U {a, 1 I E mm(C)} 
is unsatisfiable, a contradiction to the fact that M is a model! 
(2) Analogous to (1). 0 
Proof of Theorem 22. Let R be a set of rules and let W be a set of formulas. Let C 
be a minima1 conflicting set in R. 
( I ) Let M be a mode1 of 
Circum( W u R*, u R;; {ab, / r E RD}; 2) U {a, A lab, 1 r E mm(C)} 
Then, M is also a mode1 of {PI I r E ma-x(C)}; and therefore it also entails 
{a,- A Pr I r E mux(C)}. 
Now, assume M is also a mode1 of 
1% A Pr j r E min(C)}. 
Since (min( C), mux(C) ) is a conflicting core, we have 
{ar A Pr I r E min(C>) U far A Pr I r E ma(C)} 
is unsatisfiable, a contradiction to the fact that M is a model! 
(2) Analogous to (1). 0 
Proof of Theorem 23. Let M be a model of RG U Ri such that M n {ub, I r E RD} = 0. 
That is, M is a mode1 falsifying all ub,. Clearly, such a mode1 exists, since there is no 
occurrence of any ub, in RL U R;j. By definition, 
M /= LY,. > ,f?,. for all r E RD. 
This implies that 
because M b lab,. Hence, M is also a mode1 of R*,. This extends clearly to R;J u R*, 
since M is a model of Rg by definition. 0 
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Proof of Theorem 24. Let M be a model of WUR;. Consider M’ = MU{& 1 r E RD}. 
Clearly, M’ /= W U Rk, since there is no occurrence of any ab, in W U R>. Moreover, 
we have 
because M’ b ab, for all r E RD. 
Since 
M’+ WuR;uR; 
we can essentially begin with M’ and eliminate (non-deterministically) one atom ab, 
after another as long as the resulting interpretation is a model of W U Ri U RE. While 
varying our initial model M, we obtain in this way all minimal models of W U R;J U Ri. 
Such models exist since we deal with a propositional language over a finite alphabet, so 
that there is only a finite number of atoms like ab,. This shows that the circumscription 
results in a satisfiable formula. 0 
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